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Battle over Control of Low-Level Radioactive Waste: 
Some States Are Overstepping Their Bounds 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, all existing nuclear power plants, government and private, 
disposed of their low-level radioactive waste (LLRW)1 at only three 
sites: one in Nevada, one in Washington, and one in South Carolina.2 
The governors of two of the states threatened to block out-of-state waste 
from entering the sites in their states because they believed that it was 
inequitable for their states to dispose of the entire nation’s LLRW.3 To 
appease these three governors and to avoid the national crisis of having 
no place to dispose of LLRW, Congress enacted the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act (LLRW Policy Act)4 to encourage every 
state to take responsibility for its own waste, to enable states to form 
compacts, to choose sites for and license regional disposal facilities, and 
to encourage development of other sites to dispose of LLRW.5
Twenty years later, the nation still only has three active LLRW 
disposal facilities, and disposal of radioactive waste remains a hot 
political issue.6 As the issue continues to heat up, states are taking action 
to prevent waste from entering their borders.7 However, in some cases, 
 1. “The term ‘low-level radioactive waste’ means radioactive material that is not high-level 
radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct material . . . and [that] the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, consistent with existing law[,] . . . classifies as low-level radioactive waste.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2021b(9) (2000). 
 2. “The first commercial LLRW disposal site opened in Beatty, Nevada in 1962.” Greta Joy 
Dicus, Commissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, National Low Level Radioactive Waste 
Disposal Policy: A Success or a Failure?, Address at NRC Regulatory Information Conference 
(Apr. 14, 1998), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 
doc-collections/commission/speeches/1998/s98-11.html. By 1971, six sites operated in Nevada, 
Kentucky, South Carolina, New York, Washington, and Illinois. However, the New York, Illinois, 
and Kentucky sites were closed due to “leakage at the sites.” Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j. 
 5. In 1986, Congress amended the Act to provide additional deadlines and monetary 
incentives to encourage states to comply with the Act. Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842. See 
generally Deborah M. Mostaghel, The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act: An 
Overview, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 379 (1994). 
 6. See infra note 42.
 7. See infra Part II.C. 
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this state action is undermining the federal scheme of atomic energy 
regulation.8 Specifically, three states have shifted the national issue of 
LLRW disposal into the local political arena by requiring a prospective 
facility to obtain approval from the legislature, the governor, and/or the 
voters.9 These statutes have overstepped their authority because the 
political approval statutes violated the Supremacy Clause of the United 
States Constitution. As this Comment was going to press, the Utah 
Legislature proposed and passed a bill, Senate Bill 24, that bans Class B 
and C LLRW from being disposed in the state of Utah.10
LLRW regulation is governed by a complicated scheme in which the 
United States has ceded some of its regulatory authority to the states, 
with the mandate that state LLRW programs be coordinated and 
compatible with federal goals.11 If a state enacts a statute that conflicts 
with federal goals for LLRW, then the statute is preempted by federal 
law.12  
This Comment examines both the political approval requirements 
and Utah SB 24 and concludes that an outright ban of LLRW and some 
political approval requirements are unconstitutional under the Supremacy 
Clause because they conflict with the federal goal to encourage efficient 
disposal for LLRW. Part II discusses the federal statutory scheme that 
regulates atomic waste disposal and three state statutes that require a 
prospective LLRW facility to obtain political approval.13 Part III 
discusses Supreme Court authority on federal conflict preemption and 
other decisions that give a framework to analyze the constitutionality of 
political approval statutes. Part IV argues that federal law preempts state 
statutes that ban LLRW disposal, that function in the nature of a de facto 
ban of LLRW, or that regulate LLRW in a manner that is not reasonably 
related to achieving a legitimate state interest. Part V offers a brief 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part II.C.  
 10. Joe Bauman, House Votes To Ban Importing of B, C Wastes, DESERET MORNING NEWS, 
Feb. 10, 2005. Senate Bill 24 passed the Senate on February 3, 2005, without dissent and then passed 
the House five days later with a 57 to 13 vote. Id. The bill modifies Utah Code Annotated section 
19-3-307 and reads, as enacted, “No entity may accept in the state or apply for a license to accept in 
the state for commercial storage, decay in storage, treatment, incineration, or disposal: class B or 
class C low-level radioactive waste or radioactive waste having a higher radionuclide concentration 
than the highest radionuclide concentration allowed under licenses existing on the effective date of 
this section that have met all the requirements of Section 19-3-105.” Id.  
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Vermont and Maine have agreements similar to Utah’s agreement with the United States, 
but for simplicity, this Comment uses Utah’s agreement as the example.  
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conclusion. The scope of this Comment is limited to whether federal law 
preempts these statutes. It does not suggest whether preempting state 
statutes is the best policy decision, nor does it analyze states’ legitimate 
policy concerns surrounding disposal of LLRW within their borders. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Section gives background on federal regulation of nuclear 
power and explains the complex system of regulating LLRW. Initially, 
this Section outlines federal law governing nuclear power and explains 
the congressional system of delegating some responsibility over LLRW 
to the states. In conclusion, this Section outlines three relevant state 
statutes that regulate LLRW.  
A. The Federal Scheme of Regulating Low-Level  
Radioactive Waste 
The federal government had a monopoly over the operation of 
nuclear-power facilities until 1954, when Congress enacted the Atomic 
Energy Act (AEA).14 The AEA permitted private entities to own nuclear 
power facilities because Congress believed that the private sector could 
serve the national interest in developing nuclear power if the federal 
government encouraged the private sector to develop atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes, supervised by a federal system of regulation and 
licensing.15 Through the AEA, Congress opened “the door to private 
construction, ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear-power 
reactors.”16 The AEA vested all power to regulate every condition or 
element dealing with the safety of atomic energy in the Atomic Energy 
Commission.17 The Energy Reorganization Act, a supplement to the 
AEA passed in 1974, abolished the Atomic Energy Commission, created 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and gave the NRC licensing 
and regulatory duties formerly carried out by the Atomic Energy 
Commission.18 Congress believed that a uniform system of regulation 
 14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2284 (2000); Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 
F.3d 1223, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)). 
 15. See English, 496 U.S. at 81. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1240–41. 
 18. English, 496 U.S. at 81. Congress prohibited states from regulating the safety of atomic 
energy facilities because it believed that the Commission was more qualified to set safety standards 
in the complex area of atomic energy than were state governments. For more, see Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 250 (1984), discussed infra at Part III.A. 
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vested in the federal government would promote the congressional goal 
of encouraging the United States to develop and use nuclear energy as a 
power source.19
In 1980, Congress enacted the LLRW Policy Act.20 to encourage 
more sites to dispose of LLRW. After a deliberative discussion with the 
governors of the fifty states, Congress developed the Policy Act to 
persuade states to take title to their own waste and to encourage regional 
cooperation in disposing of waste.21 The ultimate goal of the Policy Act 
was to encourage more states to construct disposal sites to unburden the 
three states that bore the sole responsibility for disposing of all of the 
nation’s LLRW. Congress recognized the “acute national problem of a 
high demand for storage [of LLRW] and a dwindling supply of storage 
capacity”22 and recognized the need for a unified system of regulation.23 
Viewed in light of this backdrop, the congressional intent in both the 
AEA and the Policy Act was to promote and encourage additional sites 
to dispose of LLRW. 
B. Agreement States 
In conjunction with § 274 of the AEA,24 the LLRW Policy Act 
permits the United States to delegate certain aspects of LLRW regulation 
to the states.25 The United States transfers authority to states through § 
274 of the AEA by entering into an agreement with the state (“274 
Agreement”), signed by the governor of the state and the NRC 
 19. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250; Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1240–41. 
 20. Pub. L. No. 96-573 (Dec. 23, 1980). 
 21. The take-title provisions of the Policy Act were struck down by the United States 
Supreme Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), because they violated the Tenth 
Amendment. See generally Rhett Traband, New York v. United States: The Constitutional and 
Environmental Fallout of Low-Level Waste Disposers, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 267 (1994). 
 22. Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Washington, 518 F. Supp. 928, 
932 (E.D. Wash. 1981), aff’d sub nom., Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. 
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982); see Dicus, supra note 2 (discussing the background of the 
LLRW Policy Act and Congress’s intent in adopting the Act). 
 23. Washington, 518 F. Supp. at 932–33. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2120c (2000). 
 25. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Agreement State Program, available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/state-tribal/agreement-states.html (last modified Nov. 22, 2004); 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 209 (1983) 
(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) (2000)); see infra Part III.A. “Authority could be shifted to the 
States for control over byproduct and source material, and over special nuclear material ‘in 
quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass.’” Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 209 n.20. 
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chairman.26 In each agreement the United States permits the state to 
engage in “coordinated and compatible” regulation of certain nuclear 
materials.27
In allowing the United States to delegate its authority to states, 
Congress was clearly interested in encouraging effective nuclear waste 
disposal and in encouraging states to dispose of waste within their 
borders.28 Additionally, Congress emphasized that delegation of its 
authority to states did not affect the federal goals for and ultimate control 
over radioactive waste. 
Nothing contained in [the LLRW Policy Act] or any compact may be 
construed to confer any new authority on any . . . State to regulate the . 
. . treatment, storage, disposal, or transportation of low-level 
radioactive waste in a manner incompatible with the regulation of the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.29
An “Agreement State” has qualified authority to regulate byproduct 
materials, source materials, and special nuclear materials.30 The NRC 
directly cooperates with the state in forming standards to regulate 
radiation hazards and standards to issue licenses.31 When a state reaches 
an agreement with the NRC and the agreement is approved by Congress, 
the state becomes an “Agreement State.”32
 26. Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 209 n.20; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2021. “NRC assistance to 
States entering into Agreements includes review of requests from States for 274b Agreements (or 
amendments to existing agreements), meetings with States to discuss and resolve NRC review 
comments, and recommendations for Commission approval of proposed 274b agreements.” U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Agreement State Program, supra, note 25. The NRC also conducts 
training courses and workshops for states, evaluates states’ technical licensing requirements, reviews 
state inspection issues, evaluates state rule changes, and involves states in NRC rule making and 
regulatory efforts. Id. 
 27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1) and (g); see also Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1241 (10th Cir. 
2004). 
 28. “Nothing . . . shall be deemed to prohibit a State, subject to the provisions of its 
compact, . . . from accepting [low-level radioactive waste].” 42 U.S.C. § 2021c. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d(b)(3)(A). 
 30.  Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council AFL-CIO v. Washington, 518 F. Supp. 928, 
931–32 (E.D. Wash. 1981). 
 31. Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 210 n.21; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b), (d). See generally 
42 U.S.C. § 2021. 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b defines an “agreement State.” “The term ‘agreement State’ means that 
a State that (A) has entered into an agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission under § 274 
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; and (B) has authority to regulate the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste under such agreement.” Pub. L. No. 99-240 (1986). Each of these agreements is 
reported in the Federal Register. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Amended Agreement with State of 
Utah, 54 Fed. Reg. 50,454 (Dec. 6, 1989). Vermont’s agreement with the NRC is reported at 62 Fed. 
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The NRC has published guidelines delineating the scope of an 
Agreement State’s authority to regulate waste within its borders.33 
Specifically, the guidelines require that a state’s law governing atomic 
energy not conflict with the federal scheme of regulation.34 In addition, 
the NRC, in an effort to help Agreement States keep their programs 
compatible with federal law, has issued a directive reiterating § 274’s 
command that all state programs be “coordinated and compatible.”35 
To determine whether a state program is compatible with federal 
regulations, the directive articulates standards that consider primarily 
how the state’s action or inaction affects “the regulation of agreement 
material on a nationwide basis or on other jurisdictions.”36 A program 
becomes incompatible with federal law if its regulations preclude a 
practice that is in the national interest.37 A state is permitted to place 
“additional requirements when required to protect public health and 
safety”38 without making its program incompatible with federal 
regulations.  
In 1989, Utah and the United States entered into an agreement (the 
“Agreement”) pursuant to § 274 that gave Utah the authority to license 
and regulate LLRW disposal within its borders.39 Utah’s Agreement with 
the United States is an example of a typical 274 Agreement. The 
Agreement recognized that, in accordance with federal requirements, 
Utah law provides a system to license facilities40 and that Utah’s system 
for disposing of LLRW is compatible with federal objectives.41 The 
Reg. 6281 (Feb. 11, 1997). Maine’s agreement with the United States is reported at 63 Fed. Reg. 
67,945 (Dec. 9, 1998). 
 33. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, PROCESSING AN AGREEMENT, PROCEDURE 
NO. SA-700 (Apr. 2, 2001). 
 34. Id. § 4.1.1.2b–d, at 13. 
 35. See U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, DIRECTIVE NO. 5.9, ADEQUACY AND 
COMPATIBILITY OF AGREEMENT STATE PROGRAMS (Feb. 27, 1998). 
 36. Id. at 1. 
 37. Id. at 5. 
 38. PROCESSING AN AGREEMENT, supra note 33, § 4.1.1.2d.  
 39. Notice of Proposed Amended Agreement with State of Utah, 54 Fed. Reg. 50,454 (Dec. 
6, 1989). 
 40. Id. at 50,455 (noting that sections 26-1-27 through 26-1-29 of the Utah Code provide a 
mechanism for the State Department of Health, now the Department of Environmental Quality, “to 
issue licenses to, and perform inspections of users . . . of radioactive materials . . . and otherwise 
carry out a total radiation control program”). 
 41. Id. at 50,455–56 (“The Utah regulations provide for land disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste received from other persons which are compatible with the applicable technical 
definitions, performance objectives, technical requirements and supporting sections [of the NRC 
regulations] set out in 10 CFR part 61.”). 
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agreement was proper under § 274 because Utah’s Radiation Control 
Rules “were compatible with the Commission’s regulations.”42 Maine 
and Vermont also have entered into 274 Agreements with the United 
States.43
C. Suspect State Statutes 
However, some states have exceeded their delegated authority to 
regulate LLRW under their § 274 Agreements by passing statutes that 
conflict with federal objectives and are not coordinated and compatible 
with the federal regulation scheme. For example, Utah passed a bill to 
completely ban importation of Class B and C LLRW and a few other 
states require that a prospective LLRW facility obtain political approval 
before it can operate. For example, a previous Utah statute required a 
prospective facility that disposes of Class B and Class C LLRW.44 to be 
approved by both the legislature and the governor before it can operate in 
the state.45 The same requirement applied to an existing commercial 
LLRW facility that seeks to expand or to receive a different class of 
LLRW.46 Under the statute, a prospective facility must apply for and 
receive a license and then seek approval from the legislature and 
governor. The approval statute does not list any criteria under which a 
prospective facility will be analyzed but gives the legislature and 
governor the unfettered ability to deny an applicant for any reason or no 
reason at all.  
Similarly, Maine requires that a prospective LLRW disposal facility 
obtain approval from its legislature47 and the majority of the voters in a 
 42. Id. at 50,456 (“The Utah regulations contain provisions relating to the disposal of 
radioactive materials into the air, water and sewer and burial in soil which are essentially uniform 
with those of 10 CFR part 20 . . . . The waste disposal requirements include a waste classification 
scheme and provisions for waste form equivalent to that in 10 CFR part 61.”). 
 43. Id. at 50,454. Vermont’s agreement with the NRC is reported at 62 Fed. Reg. 6281 (Feb. 
11, 1997). Maine’s agreement with the United States is reported at 63 Fed. Reg. 67,945 (Dec. 9, 
1998). 
 44. There are three different categories of LLRW, categorized according to the amount of 
radiation that each emits. Class A LLRW emits the lowest amount of radiation, followed by Class B 
and C wastes, respectively. See 10 C.F.R. § 61.55 (defining each type of waste). 
 45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-105 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-105(2)(b)(iii) (“A person 
may not construct a new commercial radioactive waste transfer, storage, decay in storage, treatment, 
or disposal facility until . . . the governor and the Legislature have approved the facility.”). The 
statute does not apply to Class A radioactive waste. 
 46. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-105(2)(c). 
 47. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 1479 (West 2003).  
A low-level radioactive waste disposal or storage facility may not be established in the 
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statewide election48 before it can be constructed. Vermont takes a 
slightly different approach and requires that the municipality in which 
the prospective facility would be located hold a “duly warned meeting” 
and “obtain the consent of a majority of the voters, present and voting” at 
the meeting.49 Similar to the Utah statute, the Maine and Vermont 
statutes do not list any standards that an applicant facility must comply 
with to receive approval or any criteria under which a facility will be 
evaluated. 
Even though the federal government expressly ceded qualified 
regulatory responsibilities over byproduct materials, source materials, 
and special nuclear materials to each of these states, the United States did 
not cede all control over low-level wastes.50 To the extent that these 
three statutes conflict with the requirement that the state programs be 
“coordinated and compatible” with Congress’s goals for LLRW disposal, 
they violate the Supremacy Clause51 of the United States Constitution 
and are preempted by federal law. 
State, unless the Legislature has, by Private and Special Act, approved the establishment 
of that facility. The Legislature shall act expeditiously after a decision by the United 
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to approve a facility, but may not act until after 
the conclusion of any judicial review of the decision and any resulting administrative 
proceedings.  
Id. 
 48. Id. § 1493.  
A low-level radioactive waste disposal or storage facility may not be constructed or 
operated in the State unless the construction or operation is approved by a majority of the 
voters voting on the construction or operation in a statewide election. The election must 
be held in the manner prescribed by law for holding a statewide election and in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in Title 35-A, § 4302. The voters must be asked 
to vote on the acceptance or rejection of construction or operation by voting on the 
following question: “Do you approve (insert construction or operation) of a low-level 
radioactive waste (insert disposal or storage) facility as proposed for (insert location)?" 
This question must be submitted to the legal voters of the State at the next following 
statewide election after a decision by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
to approve a low-level radioactive waste facility. The construction or operation of the 
facility may not commence prior to the election. 
Id.  
 49. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7012 (f)(5) (2003).  
 50. See, e.g., Notice of Proposed Amended Agreement with State of Utah, 54 Fed. Reg. 
50,454 (Dec. 6, 1989). 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law 
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
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III. THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF NUCLEAR 
WASTE REGULATION 
 “The Supremacy Clause ‘embodies the fundamental principle that in 
certain areas the United States must act as a single nation, led by the 
federal government, rather than as a loose confederation of independent 
sovereign states.’”52 A federal law preempts state law if either Congress 
expressly declares that the law is intended to preempt state law or the 
federal law impliedly preempts state law.53 There are two types of 
implied preemption: field preemption54 and conflict preemption.55 In 
either case, “the question of preemption is one of determining 
Congressional intent.”56 Federal law trumps state law through conflict 
preemption when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a 
physical impossibility,”57 or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”58  
This Part discusses relevant precedent showing when state action that 
affects waste disposal should be preempted by federal law. Section A 
looks at Supreme Court precedent discussing when federal law preempts 
state statutes governing atomic energy, Section B reviews the Tenth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,.59 
and Section C explores analogous cases that determine when state action 
conflicts with federal objectives in the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act. 
 52. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1239 (2004) (quoting Abraham v. Hodges, 255 F. Supp. 2d 
539, 549 (D.S.C. 2002)). 
 53. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
 54. Field preemption is the dominant analysis applied to cases that discuss when a state 
statute that affects high-level nuclear waste should be preempted. Field preemption does not apply to 
LLRW because Congress does not occupy any field with relation to LLRW; Congress has expressly 
delegated authority to the states to regulate LLRW. Therefore, the only type of implied preemption 
that applies to state statutes governing LLRW is conflict preemption. This Comment does not 
discuss portions of cases that use a field preemption analysis and focuses only on relevant conflict 
preemption analysis that is binding on statutes that regulate LLRW.  
 55. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
 56. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1240 (citing Wardaid Canada Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 
U.S. 1, 6 (1986)). 
 57. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
 58. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See supra note 54 and infra note 63 for a 
discussion of why field preemption is not an issue with the suspect state statutes examined in this 
Comment. 
 59. Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2004), aff’g 
sub nom., Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Leavitt, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Utah 2002). 
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A. Supreme Court Precedent 
Three Supreme Court decisions have shaped the preemptive effect of 
the AEA, concluding that states cannot use statutes, whatever their 
purported purpose, to subvert the United States’ power to regulate atomic 
energy programs.60 Even though in each case the Supreme Court 
determined that the AEA did not preempt the state statute at issue, the 
cases outline a framework that shows that federal law preempts statutes 
that conflict with or frustrate congressional goals to promote atomic 
energy. 
In the following three cases, the Supreme Court noted that the state 
statutes at issue could be preempted either by field preemption61 or 
conflict preemption. Through its 274 Agreement with Utah, Vermont, 
and Maine, the United States has ceded some of its authority to these 
states and expressly permitted them to enact safety requirements that are 
more demanding than current federal requirements.62 Because Congress 
explicitly permitted these states to regulate nuclear safety concerns, the 
doctrine of field preemption cannot be applied to preempt laws in 
Agreement States that regulate LLRW out of safety concerns.63  
In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Development Commission, a utility company challenged 
a California statute that imposed a moratorium on the construction of 
new nuclear power plants while the state investigated whether adequate 
storage facilities and means of disposal were available. A utility 
company attempted to enjoin the enforcement of a moratorium so that it 
could construct a new nuclear power plant.64  
 60. English, 496 U.S. at 80–90; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248–51 
(1984); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
203–23 (1983). 
 61. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 204. “Absent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress’ intent to 
supercede state law altogether may be found from a ‘scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to 
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to supplement it  
. . . .’” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa 
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 62. See supra Part II.B. 
 63. Even though the field preemption analysis was the primary focus of each case, this 
Comment focuses only on the conflict preemption analysis of the following cases because that is the 
only portion that governs state laws regulating LLRW. 
 64. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 204. The Supreme Court first engaged in a field preemption 
analysis.  
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The Court noted that federal law preempts state laws to the extent 
that they actually conflict with the federal program for atomic energy.65 
The statute did not conflict with the federal goals because it did not 
frustrate or thwart the federal goal to develop nuclear power.66 and 
because the statute did not conflict with the AEA.67 The moratorium was 
not a complete ban on construction of nuclear power facilities but was a 
reasonable state measure to ensure that the state had the ability to dispose 
of nuclear waste. The statute did not hinder the development of nuclear 
power plants but merely sought to ensure that nuclear power was 
regulated in an efficient and responsible manner. Because California did 
not use the moratorium to impose its own standards on nuclear waste 
disposal or to prevent construction of nuclear power plants in the state, 
the statute did not conflict with federal law. 
Similarly, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,68 a nuclear power plant 
challenged a state statute that authorized punitive damages to be awarded 
in negligence cases. The plant challenged the statute because a jury 
awarded punitive damages to a plaintiff that was exposed to radioactive 
materials at the power plant.69 The Supreme Court determined that the 
statute did not conflict with federal law and should not be preempted.70 
Federal law regulated the safety aspects of nuclear power plants, but 
individual causes of action against power plants for torts were governed 
by state law. When Congress enacted the AEA, it knew that state 
negligence laws were in place and “intended to stand by both concepts 
and to tolerate whatever tension there was between them.”71  
Additionally, the state law and the AEA did not conflict because it 
was possible for a power plant to pay both federal fines and state-
imposed punitive damages.72 Exposing the power plant to punitive 
damages did not frustrate any purpose of the federal remedial scheme.73 
Just as the moratorium in Pacific Gas was not preempted even though it 
had an incidental effect on nuclear power by temporarily delaying its 
cultivation in California, the punitive damage statute’s effect on the 
 65. Id. at 204. 
 66. Id. at 219. 
 67. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1243 (2004) (discussing Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 222). 
 68. 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
 69. Id. at 248–57. 
 70. Id. at 257–58. 
 71. Id. at 256. 
 72. Id. at 257. 
 73. Id. 
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power plant did not conflict with the federal goals, even though it 
affected a nuclear power plant, because it regulated something outside 
nuclear power and was not aimed to hinder it. “The promotion of nuclear 
power is not to be accomplished at all costs.”74
If the state statute permitting punitive damages awards in negligence 
cases were specifically targeted at nuclear power plants to place burdens 
on them or to discourage their operation, the conflict preemption doctrine 
would have preempted the state punitive damage statute because the state 
law would have undermined the federal goals underlying the AEA.75 
However, the state tort law did not undermine those goals because 
punishing a facility for its negligence does not frustrate Congress’s desire 
to promote waste disposal.76 One of Congress’s main goals in enacting 
the AEA was to ensure safety in nuclear energy and disposal; the state 
tort law effectuated, rather than undermined, that intent.77 A state law 
cannot be preempted through conflict preemption unless it actually 
conflicts with or undermines the objectives of the federal legislation. The 
punitive damage award did not conflict with the objects of federal law. 
In a later case, English v. General Electric Co.,78 a power plant 
challenged an employee’s state law claim against it for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. An employee filed suit against her 
nuclear power plant employer after it allegedly retaliated against her for 
reporting that the plant had violated nuclear safety standards.79 The plant 
appealed the award, alleging that the award should be preempted by 
federal law because it burdened nuclear power. The Court determined 
that a tort cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
was not preempted through conflict preemption because the tort did not 
conflict with the intent or the operation of the AEA.80  
 74. Id. (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 
461 U.S. 190, 222 (1983)). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
[I]nsofar as damages for radiation injuries are concerned, pre-emption should not be 
judged on the basis that the federal government has so completely occupied the field of 
safety that state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict 
between the federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state standard in a 
damage action would frustrate the objectives of the federal law. 
Id. at 256. 
 77. Id. at 257–58. 
 78. 496 U.S. 72 (1990). 
 79. Id. at 76. 
 80. Id. at 87–90. 
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First, the court looked at whether the statute on its face conflicted 
with the AEA and concluded that it did not.81 Next, the court declared 
that it needed to look for “special features warranting preemption.”82 The 
Court did not articulate any criteria to indicate what such a “special 
feature” would be but analyzed three special features of the AEA 
provision that the district court had identified.83 The Court determined 
that none of the features warranted preemption, but in analyzing each of 
the features, the Court laid a foundation for when a state statute 
regulating atomic energy should be preempted by state law.  
The Court started with the text of the federal statutes to determine 
whether it indicated that a similar state law should be preempted.84 Next, 
it looked at the legislative history of the federal act to determine whether 
it revealed “a clear congressional purpose to supplant state-law causes of 
action that might afford broader relief.”85 It suggested that a state statute 
is only preempted through conflict preemption if the action of 
preemption would serve a federal interest.86 Neither the text of the 
statute nor the legislative history indicated an intent to preempt state-law 
punitive damage awards against nuclear power plants for retaliating 
against whistleblowers.87
The Court also noted that preemption is “ordinarily not to be implied 
absent an ‘actual conflict’” and that “[t]he ‘teaching of [the] Court’s 
decisions . . . enjoin[s] seeking out conflicts between state and federal 
regulation where none clearly exists.’”88 English specifically discusses 
delegation of authority to states under § 27489 and forecloses the 
possibility that a state requirement can be insulated from preemption 
 81. Id. at 87. 
 82. Id. 
 83. The special features were (1) that language in the AEA provided that certain 
requirements of the AEA should not apply when an employee deliberately causes a violation of a 
requirement of the Act, (2) that the AEA did not generally authorize the award of punitive damages 
who engage in retaliatory conduct, and (3) that the statute of limitations to report a safety violation 
under the state law were longer than those provided under the AEA. Id. at 87–90. 
 84. Id. at 88 (“As an initial matter, we note that [the provision of the AEA at issue] 
specifically limits its applicability . . . and does not suggest that it bars state-law tort actions.”).  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. “Absent some specific suggestion in the text or legislative history . . . , which we are 
unable to find, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to preempt all state actions that permit the 
recovery of exemplary damages [against nuclear power plants].” Id. at 89. 
 88. Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 
362 U.S. 440, 466 (1960)).  
 89. Id. at 81. 
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based on an agreement with the United States by reiterating the statutory 
requirement that Agreement State actions have to be “coordinated and 
compatible” with the NRC.90  
The English opinion demonstrates that to determine whether state 
action is preempted, one has to look both at the Atomic Energy Act and 
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which specifically create a 
federal scheme for governing LLRW.91 The tort action did not conflict 
with the AEA because it “encourage[d] employees to report safety 
violations and establishe[d] a procedure to protect them from any 
resulting retaliation.”92 Like the statute in Pacific Gas, the statute in 
English functioned in harmony with federal goals; thus, without a 
conflict, there was no conflict preemption. 
Even though the Supreme Court determined in each case that the 
AEA did not preempt the state statute at issue, these cases illustrate 
several important principles regarding preemption. First, a state law 
conflicts with a federal law if it is impossible to comply with the 
requirements of the state law and the requirements of the federal law. 
Second, if a state law is specifically designed to thwart or frustrate the 
objectives of the federal law, or if the effect of the state law is to an 
unnecessary hurdle on the federal scheme of regulation, the statute is 
preempted if it conflicts with federal law.  
B. The Tenth Circuit’s Application of Supreme Court  
Precedent in Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson  
Similar to the Supreme Court cases, the Tenth Circuit recently 
determined that a state statute is preempted if it is designed to hinder or 
prevent a nuclear waste disposal facility from operating in the state. In 
Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson,93 the Tenth Circuit 
struck down a series of Utah state laws designed to prevent a licensed 
high-level waste facility from operating in the state.94 Two classes of 
those laws were preempted through conflict preemption: (1) a statute that 
eliminated the statutory and common-law limited liability of directors, 
 90. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021(g) (2000)). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing English, 496 U.S. at 
82). 
 93. 376 F.3d 1223 (2004). 
 94. The Tenth Circuit struck down five different classes of statutes; however, this Comment 
focuses its analysis of Skull Valley to the two classes of statutes that were preempted through conflict 
preemption.  
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officers, and shareholders of a high-level waste disposal facility.95 and 
(2) a statute that required the operator of a high-level waste facility to 
give the state seventy-five percent of the “unfunded potential liability” of 
the site.96  
Section 19-3-318 of the Utah Code abolished limited liability for 
shareholders in companies operating disposal facilities. The statute 
conflicted with federal law because it “upend[ed] a fundamental 
principle of corporate law as applied to SNF storage facilities [and] 
disrupt[ed] the balance that Congress sought to achieve.”97 The court 
noted that “Congress’ purpose [in allowing the private sector to 
participate in nuclear power] was to remove the economic impediments 
in order to stimulate the private development of electric energy by 
nuclear power.”98 The overarching federal goal with respect to nuclear 
waste is to promote states and private entities to participate in producing 
nuclear energy and disposing of nuclear waste.99  
Because stockholders are generally not personally liable under Utah 
law for the debts of a corporation, the statute conflicted with federal 
objectives because “the abolition of limited liability attempts a sea 
change in the law of corporations and is targeted at the nuclear industry 
only.”100 The statute’s direct aim at the nuclear industry indicated that 
the statute was intended to undermine the federal purpose of promoting 
efficient waste disposal. The Utah statute directly undermined that 
objective because it directly discouraged commercial involvement in 
high-level waste by taking away the financial incentive of commercial 
disposal by exposing shareholders to potential liability.101
Similarly, Section 19-3-319 of the Utah Code, the portion of the 
Utah licensing scheme that required a disposal facility to pay the state 
seventy-five percent of the “unfunded potential liability” of the 
 95. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-316 (2003). 
 96. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-319(3). 
 97. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d at 1251. The court also rejected Utah’s argument that the statutes 
were similar to the statutes in Silkwood and English because “the abolition of limited liability 
attempts a sea change in the law of corporations and is targeted at the nuclear industry only” rather 
than involving “a state tort remedy that existed prior to the enactment of federal legislation regarding 
nuclear power.” Id. 
 98. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978)). 
 99. See id.  
 100. Id. at 1251. 
 101. Id. 
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facility,102 conflicted with federal law. The federal scheme vested the 
NRC with the authority to determine when to license a facility and to 
determine the amount of liability insurance that a facility must obtain.103 
Section 319, by imposing its own independent determination of potential 
liability, conflicts with the objectives of federal law.104  
The court distinguished Section 319 from tort laws in Silkwood and 
English by noting that the tort laws were existing state law remedies but 
that Section 319 was directly targeted at the nuclear waste disposal 
industry. Additionally, Section 319 should be preempted because, unlike 
the tort laws in the other cases, it affected limitations on liability, 
indemnification, and determination of financial responsibility of disposal 
facilities.105 As the district court noted, the disposal facility was a limited 
liability corporation and the statute would subject directors, officers, and 
shareholders in the corporation to unlimited risk.106 “Such individual risk 
would more likely than not have the effect of preventing the construction 
and operation of a SNF storage facility.”107
C. Conflict Preemption Applies to Section 274 Agreements  
with States over LLRW 
The exact limits on a state’s ability to regulate LLRW under § 274 
has not been widely litigated, likely because of the few prospective 
facilities and the massive investment involved in challenging a state 
statute. The issue has never reached the Supreme Court, and only one 
circuit court has determined the scope of a state’s authority to regulate 
LLRW after it has entered into an agreement with the NRC.108  
This Section takes the limited precedent available and shows that 
states’ actions to regulate LLRW pursuant to a 274 Agreement are 
limited and discusses that states cannot enact regulations that impair the 
United States’ goal to promote atomic energy development and disposal. 
 102. UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-319(3) (2003). 
 103. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1250 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 104. Id. at 1249–52 (distinguishing Utah’s law from the laws in Silkwood and English because 
Utah’s law could not be “characterized as ‘existing state tort law remedies’” (quoting Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 252 (1984)). 
 105. Id. at 1250. 
 106. Skull Valley, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 1246. 
 107. Id. at 1246–47. 
 108. See Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
3BEU-FIN 5/11/2005 11:55:25 AM 
155] States Overreaching on Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
 171 
 
1. Agreement States’ power to regulate LLRW is limited 
Congress did not cede all of its authority over LLRW to the states, 
and the states cannot regulate in a way that undermines the federal goal 
of promoting waste disposal.109 The Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to 
squarely address the scope of an Agreement State’s authority to regulate 
LLRW, determined that, although the United States ceded some of its 
authority to regulate LLRW to the states through 274 Agreements, 
“complete control of [waste disposal] sites [does] not pass with the 
assignment of regulatory responsibilities.”110 In Wash. State. Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, the State of Washington, a 274 
Agreement State, banned out-of-state waste from entering the state for 
disposal.111 Washington argued that the ban was permissible because, 
through its 274 Agreement and the LLRW Policy Act, the United States 
ceded all control over low-level waste disposal to Washington.112  
The Ninth Circuit rejected Washington’s argument and held that 
Washington’s 274 Agreement gives it only limited control over LLRW. 
“The regulation of the disposal of low-level radioactive waste is a 
legitimate federal activity, and Congress has not waived or delegated its 
authority over the subject.”113 Further, neither the agreement between the 
United States and Washington nor the LLRW Policy Act “is a grant of 
total authority to the states over the disposal of low-level wastes within 
their own borders.”114 An initiative to ban out-of-state waste is 
preempted by federal law through conflict preemption because closing a 
 109. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 81 (1990). 
 110. Spellman, 684 F.2d at 630. 
 111. Id. In the LLRW Policy Act, Congress provides that states can enter into compacts with 
other states to provide a site to dispose of LLRW. 42 U.S.C. § 2021d. Once a group of states has 
entered into a compact and identified a facility to dispose of waste for their compact, Congress gives 
the members of the compact the authority to exclude waste from a state outside of the compact from 
being disposed of at their site. Id. Congress placed some conditions on the ability of a compact site 
to exclude noncompact waste. Id. One of those conditions was that a compact could not exclude 
waste until after 1986. Id. § 2021d(c). The site that attempted to exclude waste in Spellman was the 
designated site for a compact, so it would have been permitted to exclude waste after 1986. 
Spellman, 684 F.2d at 629–31. However, even though the LLRW Policy Act permits a designated 
compact disposal site to exclude noncompact waste, nothing in the Act gives a compact state the 
right to exclude out-of-state waste from entering its borders at a site other than the compact site.  
 112. Id. at 629. 
 113. Id. at 630. 
 114. Id. 
3BEU-FIN 5/11/2005 11:55:25 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2005 
172 
 
state’s borders to LLRW “would significantly aggravate the national 
problem of low-level waste disposal.”115
2. States cannot use delegated authority to thwart federal objectives  
Other similar cases under the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (“RCRA”) help identify the limits of state action when it affects a 
federal regulatory scheme. The federal system of regulating solid waste 
under the RCRA closely parallels the regulation of LLRW under the Act 
and § 274. RCRA regulates the disposal of solid waste.116 RCRA 
permits states to assume some responsibility over their waste disposal by 
entering into an agreement with the United States, similar to a 274 
Agreement under the AEA.117 Further, just as Agreement States under 
the AEA have authority to enact additional regulations,118 RCRA 
provides that states can adopt disposal regulations that are more stringent 
than those required under the federal system.119 This provision is 
commonly called “the RCRA Savings Clause.” 
Purporting to act under the RCRA Savings Clause, several localities 
passed laws or ordinances banning disposal of solid waste within their 
borders.120 In all these cases, the courts determined RCRA prevented 
local actions, even if allegedly enacted under the RCRA Savings Clause. 
The ordinances were preempted because they thwarted the goal of 
RCRA, which is to promote waste disposal, by making it more difficult 
or impossible to dispose of solid waste.121
 115. Id. at 631. But see Susan L. Satter, Congressional Recognition of State Authority over 
Nuclear Power and Waste Disposal, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 839–41 (1982) (criticizing Spellman 
as disregarding the practical effect of congressional intent). “In another instance of inverting 
congressional intent, the court correctly noted that the Low-Level Waste Act ‘recognizes the 
particularly acute national problem of a high demand for storage and a dwindling supply of storage 
capacity.’” Id. at 839. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2000).  
 117. See supra Part II. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See 42 U.S.C. § 6929. This clause that allows states to enact more stringent regulations 
than that provided in federal law for solid waste is often referred to as the RCRA Savings Clause. 
See David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal Preemption 
Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1149 (1999). 
 120. See generally Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 27 F.3d 1499 (10th 
Cir. 1994), remanded to 917 F. Supp. 1514 (N.D. Okla. 1995). 
 121. See Blue Circle, 27 F.3d 1499 (holding that a conditional-use permit that functioned in 
the nature of a de facto ban would conflict with the goals of RCRA because instead of facilitating 
waste disposal it prevented it); ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986) (“A 
county cannot, by attaching the label ‘more stringent requirements’ or ‘site selection’ to an 
ordinance that in language and history defies such description, arrogate to itself the power to enact a 
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For example, in Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of County 
Commissioners, a county enacted an ordinance that required every 
disposal facility to obtain a conditional-use permit.122 A prospective 
facility sought injunctive relief from the ordinance because it suspected 
that the county would not grant any conditional-use permits and was 
using the ordinance as a scheme to effectively ban waste disposal.123 
Similar to the conflict preemption analysis that the Supreme Court used 
in English, Silkwood, and Pacific Gas, the Tenth Circuit identified the 
purpose of RCRA and determined that the county ordinance would be 
preempted if it conflicted with the purpose. It determined that the 
ordinance was contrary to the intent of the RCRA because the ordinance 
“thwart[ed]” the federal RCRA policy.124 Although there is no direct 
link between the solid waste cases and the atomic energy cases, the 
framework in Blue Circle is helpful in determining whether political 
approval requirements for LLRW facilities are preempted because the 
dual federal/state regulation of RCRA closely parallels the dual 
federal/state regulation of LLRW. 
Blue Circle articulated two factors to determine whether a state 
regulation conflicts with federal law: (1) regulations that amount to an 
explicit or de facto total ban of an activity that is otherwise encouraged 
by the system of federal regulation will ordinarily be preempted through 
conflict preemption;125 (2) regulations that fall short of imposing a total 
ban on encouraged activity will ordinarily be upheld so long as they (a) 
are supported by a record establishing that they are reasonable responses 
to a legitimate local concern for safety or welfare and (b) do not actually 
conflict with federal law.126  
Under the first factor, a regulation that is either a ban or a de facto 
ban of an activity that is encouraged by RCRA is preempted. The 
purpose of RCRA is to “assist states and localities in the development of 
improved solid waste management techniques to facilitate resource 
measure that as a practical matter cannot function other than to subvert federal policies concerning 
the safe handling of hazardous waste.”); Rollins Envtl. Servs. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police 
Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127, 1132 (La. 1979) (holding that RCRA preempted a parish ordinance’s flat ban 
on hazardous waste disposal because “spotty . . . parochial control” in the nature of a “stifling 
prohibition” would undermine RCRA’s hazardous waste management goals). 
 122. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d. at 1502. 
 123. See id. at 1509–10. 
 124. Id. at 1504–06. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1507–09. 
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recovery and conservation.”127 Waste disposal is “an activity that is 
otherwise encouraged by RCRA.”128  
A state or locality cannot ban an activity that RCRA encourages 
without directly undermining the goals of RCRA.129 If the federal RCRA 
scheme is designed to promote waste disposal, a state cannot use its 
regulatory authority to completely ban the activity. By “attaching the 
label ‘more stringent requirements’ or ‘site selection’ to an ordinance 
that in language and history defies such description,” a state or locality 
cannot “arrogate to itself the power to enact a measure that as a practical 
matter cannot function other than to subvert federal policies.”130 If 
individual states or localities started to ban waste disposal “through 
artfully designed ordinances, the national goal for safe, environmentally 
sound toxic waste disposal would surely be frustrated.”131 The result 
would be a “stifling prohibition” on RCRA’s hazardous waste 
management goals.132 A regulation that bans waste disposal under 
RCRA conflicts with federal law because it defeats safe federal solutions 
and directly subverts RCRA.133 Similarly, courts have uniformly held 
that state action to ban high-level waste disposal conflicts with federal 
law.134
A regulation that functions in the nature of a de facto ban causes a 
conflict with federal law that is just as unconstitutional as an explicit ban. 
In Blue Circle, the local ordinance requiring a disposal facility to obtain 
a conditional-use permit did not impose an explicit ban on waste 
disposal, so the Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for 
the parties to develop a factual record, through presentation of experts 
and examination of legislative intent, to determine whether the ordinance 
imposed a de facto ban.135 On remand, the district court determined that 
 127. Id. at 1506 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(1) (1994)). 
 128. Id. at 1508. 
 129. See ENSCO, Inc. v. Dumas, 807 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1986); Rollins Envtl. Servs. of 
La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127, 1132 (La. 1979). 
 130. ENSCO, 807 F.2d at 745.  
 131. Rollins Environmental Servs. (FS), Inc. v. St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 132. Iberville Parish, 371 So. 2d at 1132. 
 133. See Hermes Consol., Inc. v. People, 849 P.2d 1302, 1311 (Wyo. 1993). 
 134. United States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 822–25, 828 (6th Cir. 2001); Jersey Central 
Power & Light Co. v. Township of Lacey, 772 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3rd Cir. 1985); Illinois v. Gen. 
Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1982). None of these cases are helpful to the discussion of banning 
LLRW because all three cases are based solely on a field preemption analysis. See supra note 54 
(discussing why field preemption does not apply to state regulations of LLRW). 
 135. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d 1499, 1510 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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the conditional-use permit requirement effected a de facto ban on waste 
disposal.136  
The scheme was a de facto ban because no property located in the 
county could meet the location requirements to obtain a permit.137 The 
county did not produce any evidence to show that an acceptable site 
existed and argued that the ordinance was not a de facto ban because the 
county might relent and grant a permit to a facility that applied for a 
license or that the county might rezone so that other possible sites would 
become available.138 The court held that a hypothetical, standardless 
possibility that a site might be approved did not overcome the contention 
that the regulation imposed a de facto ban.  
Further, a standardless permit scheme can be unconstitutional as a de 
facto ban because it creates the potential for “sham” and “subterfuge.”139 
The courts have noted that they cannot allow a state to “completely 
evade judicial review simply by requiring a conditional use permit, 
which is then granted or denied at the discretion of local decision-
makers.”140 For example, in Ogden Environmental Services. v. City of 
San Diego, the City of San Diego enacted an ordinance requiring an 
RCRA disposal facility to apply for and receive a conditional use permit 
before it could operate in the city.141 The ordinance did not provide any 
standards to govern the issuance of a permit and the City Council did not 
adopt any specific requirements for disposal facilities.142  
Allowing a city to deny a permit on vague and unspecified reasons or 
on the “generalized environmental or health and safety concerns” 
without articulating specific health or safety concerns or setting forth 
particular environmental requirements which the facility must meet to 
obtain a permit frustrates congressional intent.143 The standardless 
scheme was preempted because it functioned as a de facto ban. 
Under the second prong, an ordinance is preempted as a sham or a 
naked attempt to sabotage federal policy of encouraging efficient waste 
 136. Blue Circle, 917 F. Supp. 1514, 1520 (N.D. Okla. 1995). 
 137. The statute required an acceptable site to be a 160-acre plot situated in an industrially 
zoned area, whose boundaries are at least one mile from any platted residential area. Blue Circle, 27 
F.3d at 1518–20. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 1446–47 (S.D. Cal. 1988). 
 140. Id. at 1446. 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1448. 
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disposal “if the ordinance is not addressed to a legitimate local concern, 
or if it is not reasonably related to that concern.”144 To determine 
whether a regulation is an attempt to thwart federal policy, the court must 
review the purpose of the local regulation.145 The state bears the burden 
to identify a legitimate local concern and to show that the regulation is a 
reasonable response to that concern.146  
As part of the inquiry, the court needs to examine the impact of the 
local ordinance on the objective of federal law because, “there can be no 
implied preemption unless the local ordinance thwarts the federal policy 
in a material way.”147 Further, no matter what the stated purpose of a 
regulation, “preemption analysis cannot ignore the effect of the 
challenged state action.”148 Any other approach would enable statute 
legislatures to “nullify nearly all unwanted federal legislation by simply 
publishing a legislative committee report articulating some state interest 
or policy—other than frustration of the federal objective—that would be 
tangentially furthered by the proposed state law.”149
On remand, the County attempted to demonstrate the local concern 
over disposal in three ways: (1) an unsupported assertion that disposal 
threatened health and safety on persons and the environment, (2) a 
portion of a law review article attached to its brief that discussed disposal 
issues but did not support the county’s position, and (3) the deposition 
testimony of a disposal facility employee indicating that the facility had 
not met emission standards promulgated by the EPA.150 The court 
determined that none of the evidence demonstrated that the ordinance 
was addressed to a legitimate local concern for safety or welfare and 
none demonstrated that the ordinance was a reasonable response to a 
local concern.151
 144. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d 1499, 1508 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 145. “It is, after all, very difficult to determine the bona-fides of a collective legislative body 
where motivation may vary among the members of that body and where, in most cases, the 
motivations may be complex and easily disguised.” Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 1508–09. “Whatever the purpose or purposes of the state law, preemption analysis 
cannot ignore the effect of the challenged state action on the preempted field.” Id. at 1509 (quoting 
Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992)). 
 148. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d at 1509. 
 149. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 
505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992)). 
 150. Blue Circle, 917 F. Supp. 1514, 1520–21 (N.D. Okla. 1995). 
 151. Id. 
3BEU-FIN 5/11/2005 11:55:25 AM 
155] States Overreaching on Low-Level Radioactive Waste 
 177 
 
The ordinance was preempted because it functioned in the nature of a 
de facto ban of waste disposal, because the county did not show a 
legitimate health and safety interest, and because the county did not 
demonstrate that the criteria of the ordinance were reasonably related to a 
legitimate local interest.  
The two-principle test in Blue Circle is the best test to determine 
whether a statute requiring a potential LLRW facility to obtain additional 
approval or permits conflicts with federal law because it balances the 
intricacies of the dual system of state and federal regulation of LLRW.  
IV. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS POLITICAL APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 
STATUTES 
This Part applies the analysis from Blue Circle to the political 
approval statutes, showing that a modified version of the Blue Circle test 
encompasses all of the guidance from Pacific Gas, English, and 
Silkwood. It determines that the political approval statutes are preempted 
because they conflict with the federal goals for atomic energy regulation 
by discouraging rather than promoting efficient waste disposal, and then 
concludes by offering a suggestion to states on how to regulate legitimate 
concerns surrounding waste disposal without crossing the conflict 
preemption line. 
The Blue Circle test is the most effective test that may be applied to 
state statutes that seek to regulate LLRW. Pacific Gas, English, and 
Silkwood are binding precedents that stand for the general principle that a 
statute that undermines the federal goal of encouraging states to develop 
atomic energy is preempted through conflict preemption.152 The adapted 
Blue Circle test takes the Supreme Court precedents and works them into 
a test that applies to the special circumstances in which a state is using its 
regulatory authority to enact a “more stringent” regulation as a guise to 
thwart federal policy. The Blue Circle test specifically accounts for (1) 
the dual federal/state system of regulation through 274 Agreements, (2) 
Congress’s mandate that state programs be “coordinated and compatible” 
with federal objectives, and (3) situations in which states intend to ban or 
discourage waste disposal.  
 
A. The New Blue Circle Test for LLRW 
 
 152. See supra Part III.A. 
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This Section applies the Blue Circle test to political approval statutes 
and shows that the approval statutes function as a de facto ban. Approval 
statutes are not a reasonable response to a legitimate state interest, and 
they directly conflict with federal goals to promote efficient waste 
disposal. This Subsection examines the approval statutes under both of 
the prongs in the new test and concludes that they will be preempted 
under either prong. 
 
1. States cannot ban or effectively ban LLRW disposal 
  
Under the first prong of the test, a state statute regulating LLRW is 
preempted through conflict preemption if it either explicitly imposes a 
ban on LLRW disposal or if it functions in the nature of a de facto ban. 
None of the three statutes imposes an explicit ban on LLRW disposal but 
this Section briefly discusses why an explicit ban of LLRW is 
unconstitutional. 
During his first State of the State address, Utah Governor Jon 
Huntsman Jr. suggested that Class B and C LLRW could be banned from 
Utah during the current legislative session.153 He said, “My position is 
clear: B and C waste will not be dumped in Utah,” and he stated further 
that, by the time the current legislative session is over, “we should no 
longer be discussing the possibility [of the hotter waste coming to 
Utah].”154 The Utah Legislature responded to the Governor’s request and 
passed a bill that banned Class B and C waste from being disposed of in 
the state.155 The state did not base its ban on articulated safety 
concerns.156
Just as the Ninth Circuit determined in Spellman, Utah—or any other 
state—does not have the authority to ban LLRW because the action runs 
afoul of the congressional mandate upon which 274 Agreements are 
conditioned: the state program must be coordinated and compatible with 
the federal program. “The regulation of the disposal of low-level 
radioactive waste is a legitimate federal activity, and Congress has not 
 153. Bob Bernick, Jr. & Joe Bauman, Huntsman Calls for Ban on Import of ‘Hotter’ Nuclear 
Wastes, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 18, 2005; Lisa Riley Roche, New Vision in Utah’s Old 
Statehouse, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005.  
 154. See Roche, supra note 153. 
 155. See supra note 10.  
 156. The legislative task force that drafted the bill did not receive any testimony from the Utah 
Department of Environmental Quality indicating that the waste could not be stored safely. Bauman, 
supra note 10. Contrarily, DEQ officials told the task force that “the current practices of disposal in 
our state guarantees safety.” Id. 
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waived or delegated its authority over the subject.”157 Because neither 
the LLRW Policy Act nor § 274 completely grants regulatory authority 
over LLRW to the states, a state cannot take action that undermines the 
federal goals to promote efficient waste disposal.158
Although they do not impose an explicit ban, the political approval 
statutes likely function as a de facto ban. The political approval statutes 
subject prospective disposal facilities that meet all applicable federal 
licensing standards to the political whims of a state legislature, of a 
governor, or of voters.159 This means that a facility can be located in an 
optimal location, pose no unreasonable threat to the environment, meet 
all imaginable safety criteria, and still be denied access to operate in a 
state simply because the governor, legislature, or voters block the 
facility’s operation for no clear reason. Their decision can be made on 
any basis or even no basis at all. “[A]llowing a locality to completely 
evade judicial review simply by requiring [an additional approval 
requirement], which is then granted or denied at the discretion of local 
decision-makers, creates the potential for . . . ‘sham’ and 
‘subterfuge.’”160
An ordinance is a de facto ban when it is impossible for a site to 
comply with the requirements of a conditional use permit.161 In addition, 
a standardless permit scheme is unconstitutional as a de facto ban 
because the scheme creates the potential for “sham” and “subterfuge” by 
state actors charged with evaluating an application for approval.162 None 
of the three statutes lists any requirements that a potential site needs to 
meet before it can be approved.163 A statute that merely seeks to impose 
an additional approval requirement on a prospective facility will have the 
actual effect of functioning in the nature of a de facto ban if the facility is 
denied approval.164 Just as the court noted in Ogden, a state cannot 
“completely evade judicial review” by requiring a potential LLRW 
facility to apply for approval from the governor, the legislature, and/or 
 157. Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th 
Cir. 1982); see supra Part III.C.1 (discussing limits on state action under 274 Agreements). 
 158. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 159. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 160. Blue Circle, 917 F. Supp. 1514, 1520 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (omission in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ogden Envtl. Servs. v. City of San Diego, 687 F. Supp. 1436, 
1446–47 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that a standardless permit scheme amounted to a de facto ban)). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Ogden, 687 F. Supp. at 1446. 
 163. See supra Part II.B. 
 164. Id. 
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the voters when the approval is granted or denied at the unfettered 
discretion of the local decision-makers.  
Since none of the statutes articulate specific health or safety concerns 
or set forth particular environmental requirements which the facility must 
meet to comply, all of the statutes appear to function in the nature of a de 
facto ban. Even though the Blue Circle court determined that it could not 
conclude whether the conditional use permit scheme imposed a de facto 
ban without a sufficient factual record, that case is distinguishable from 
the approval statutes because the conditional use permit ordinance listed 
several objective requirements that a facility had to comply with. The 
issue was a factual dispute as to whether a site existed in the county that 
was capable of meeting all of the requirements.  
In this case, even though no factual record exists as to whether a 
potential LLRW facility would receive political approval in Utah, Maine, 
or Vermont, the statutes function in the nature of a de facto ban because 
they are conditionless. As a matter of law, the conditionless schemes in 
Utah, Vermont, and Maine are preempted because they are de facto 
bans.165 Furthermore, the mere existence of the political approval 
requirement discourages any potential waste disposal sites from applying 
for a license in any of these three states because of the possibility that it 
will never receive the required political approval. Undertaking the 
investment to plan a facility and apply for a license is a financial risk 
since a licensed facility could be blocked from operating if it does not 
receive political approval. 
The political climate against nuclear waste indicates that a new 
facility is not likely to receive political approval. In Utah, for example, it 
was front-page news for two days that the Governor was threatening to 
ban LLRW.166 Furthermore, the intense social reaction to the possibility 
of a high-level waste facility west of Salt Lake City prompted the Utah 
legislature to enact a series of extreme statutory provisions designed to 
block its construction.167 Utah also challenged the facility’s license and 
then the authority of the federal government to issue a license.168 Even 
though LLRW is less threatening than high-level waste, the drastic 
measures and intense response indicate that the political conditions in 
 165. Ogden, 687 F. Supp. at 1446. 
 166. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 167. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1228 (2004). 
 168. In re Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., 56 N.R.C. 390, 392 (2002) (determining that the NRC 
possessed the authority to license the PFS facility), aff’d, Bullcreek v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 359 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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Utah, and likely in other states, are extremely hostile to waste disposal 
facilities because of the negative public perception toward them. This 
climate makes it unlikely that the legislature, the voters, and/or the 
governor will approve a prospective facility—showing that the approval 
requirement essentially functions as a de facto ban. 
 
2. State statutes must be a reasonable response to a legitimate state 
interest 
 
Further, even if the states were to prevail under the first part of the 
analysis and show that the approval requirements do not function as a de 
facto ban, each statute would still be preempted under the second prong 
of the test because a standardless political approval requirement cannot 
be a reasonable response to a legitimate local concern.  
Under the second prong of the test, a statute that falls short of 
imposing a de facto ban on LLRW disposal will be upheld so long as it is 
supported by a record establishing that the statute is a reasonable 
response to a legitimate local concern. A state should be given latitude to 
enact statutes to regulate legitimate local concerns surrounding LLRW, 
especially in light of the NRC’s directive establishing that Agreement 
States have authority to enact more stringent requirements than those 
required by the federal scheme.169 However, if a statute does not regulate 
a legitimate local concern or the statute is not a reasonable response to 
such a concern, the statute may be preempted as “a sham and nothing 
more than a naked attempt to sabotage federal” LLRW policy and 
disposal.170
The state has the burden to prove that a statute regulating LLRW is a 
legitimate response to a local concern.171 Blue Circle advocated using an 
objective analysis of the statute’s purpose, but in the LLRW context, a 
subjective analysis is required. In Skull Valley, the Tenth Circuit declined 
to apply Blue Circle’s objective approach because it found that the 
standard in Pacific Gas, English, and Silkwood required a subjective 
analysis of the statute.172  
None of the statutes list any legislative objective or local concern to 
which the legislature was reasonably responding by requiring political 
 169. See supra Part II. 
 170. See Blue Circle, 27 F.3d 1499, 1508 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 171. See Blue Circle, 917 F. Supp. 1514, 1520 (N.D. Okla. 1995). 
 172. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1252 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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approval of a prospective site.173 Even if, given the opportunity, each 
state could identify legitimate state interests surrounding the disposal of 
LLRW, the statutes will still fail because a standardless approval 
requirement can never be a reasonable response to even the more 
important local concerns. To be a reasonable response, the statute must 
be tailored to achieve its objective.  
Giving a legislature or a governor unfettered power to veto approval 
of a facility is not a reasonable response to even the most pressing state 
concerns. Each state already has a comprehensive licensing process that 
accounts for safety and functional aspects of the facility.174 Each state 
has implemented a response system and has identified a state agency to 
regulate and oversee storage facilities.175 However, the approval statutes 
give authority to the legislature or the voters to approve a prospective 
facility—people who have no real understanding of how such a facility 
functions nor any comprehension of the unique and special 
considerations required by its location. Rather, the voters, as well as the 
legislators and governor whom they elect, are susceptible to scare 
propaganda and irrational decisions that have no bearing on a specific 
plant, and these actors are unlikely to be concerned with ensuring that 
their approval decision is coordinated and compatible with the federal 
objective of promoting efficient waste disposal. Thus, no state can meet 
the burden to show that a conditionless political approval requirement is 
a reasonable response to a legitimate local concern.  
However, for a statute to be preempted under the second prong, it 
must actually conflict with the federal objective for LLRW.176 A statute 
that frustrates the operation of federal law is preempted through conflict 
preemption.177 “If the purpose of the act cannot otherwise be 
accomplished—if its operation within its chosen field else must be 
frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural effect—the state law 
must yield to the regulation of Congress within the sphere of its 
delegated power.”178 The series of courts that have struck down similar 
measures imposing additional requirements or bans on RCRA disposal 
facilities noted that states undermine the federal scheme of regulation 
 173. See supra Part II. 
 174. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-3-101 (2003). 
 175. See, e.g., id. 
 176. See supra Part III.C. 
 177. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d 1499, 1509 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 178. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)). 
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when their requirements discourage rather than encourage disposal. 
Similarly, permitting states to exercise “spotty parochial control” over 
waste disposal “stifles” the federal goals for LLRW waste 
management.179  
To determine whether a statute conflicts with the federal legislation, 
a court should consider how the state’s action or inaction affects “the 
regulation of agreement material on a nationwide basis or on other 
jurisdictions.”180 The federal objective is to encourage facilities 
operating in each state to promote the efficient disposal of LLRW.181 
Since there are only three active LLRW disposal facilities in the country, 
even one state’s act of discouraging or preventing a potential LLRW site 
from functioning in its borders could have a large effect on the 
nationwide disposal of LLRW waste. One state’s action to prevent 
LLRW disposal “would significantly aggravate the national problem of 
low-level waste disposal.”182  
The NRC’s directive counseled that looking at how a state’s action 
or inaction affected the entire federal scheme indicates whether it 
conflicts with federal law.183 The potential outcome if all states enacted 
similar approval requirement statutes shows that they conflict with 
federal law. If states were permitted to impose impossible or arbitrary 
approval requirements or standards, then other states would likely adopt 
similar statutes to keep out undesirable waste and cripple the objectives 
of the LLRW Policy Act to encourage states to operate facilities. If all 
the states in the union, or even just these three, used their approval 
statutes to block potential facilities from operating, they would succeed 
in destroying Congress’s goal of encouraging states to develop their own 
system to dispose of LLRW waste.  
These political approval statutes are distinguishable from the 
California statute in Pacific Gas, which imposed a moratorium on the 
construction of nuclear power plants.184 The moratorium complied with 
 179. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d at 1506–07. But see Satter, supra note 115, at 840 (arguing that 
because Congress ceded power to regulate LLRW to the states regardless of the purpose for 
regulation, “Congress expanded the scope of a state authority to include all responsibility for low-
level wastes”).  
 180. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d at 1506–07. 
 181. See supra Part II.  
 182. Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627 (9th 
Cir. 1982); see also Part III.C.1 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision that Washington State’s ban 
on LLRW is preempted through federal law). 
 183. See supra Part II. 
 184. See supra Part III.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Pacific Gas). 
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all of the prongs of the modified Blue Circle test discussed in Part IV: it 
was not a complete ban on construction of nuclear power facilities but 
was a reasonable state measure to ensure that the State of California had 
the ability to dispose of nuclear waste. The moratorium was exactly the 
type of exercise of state power that the modified test is designed to 
protect. California identified a legitimate local economic concern about 
building more power plants and imposed a narrowly tailored moratorium 
on construction of new plants while it studied disposal issues.185
Unlike the punitive-damages tort awards in English and Silkwood 
that had an incidental effect on nuclear power plants, the political 
approval requirements are directly aimed at disposal facilities. The 
political approval requirements are similar to the unfunded potential 
liability statute and the statute eliminating limited liability of 
shareholders that the Tenth Circuit struck down in Skull Valley.186 Just as 
those statutes directly undermined the commercial motivation to develop 
a high-level waste disposal facility by eliminating the financial 
incentives, the political approval requirements directly target potential 
LLRW disposal sites by subjecting them to arbitrary review after they 
have received a license to operate. The approval requirement effects a 
“sea change” targeted only at the nuclear industry, just as the statutes in 
Skull Valley did.  
The political approval statutes are preempted because they conflict 
with federal goals by eroding cooperation between the states in 
controlling radiation hazards and inhibiting the orderly regulatory pattern 
that Congress contemplated for LLRW.187
 
B. Acceptable State Statutes 
 
This analysis does not suggest that Congress intended to deny states 
all control over prospective facilities seeking to operate within their 
borders. Rather, this analysis suggests that states need to regulate their 
concerns within the framework of power that Congress has expressly 
ceded to them. If Utah, Vermont, and Maine have enacted the approval 
requirements to give their legislatures, governors, and voters a chance to 
approve the impact of the facility on safety or the environment, the states 
 185. See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the Pacific Gas decision). 
 186. See supra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Skull Valley decision). 
 187. See Jane Chuang, Who Should Win the Garbage Wars? Lessons for the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2403, 2467 (2004) (noting that the Policy Act 
did not resolve the conflict over LLRW disposal but just “shifted [it] to more local arenas”). 
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are taking the wrong road. Other states, including Connecticut, have 
adopted statutes that list areas of legitimate local concern that a 
prospective facility must comply with. These types of statutes withstand 
the Blue Circle analysis because they are reasonably tailored to achieve 
their enumerated local concerns.  
This Section starts by suggesting a route that states like Utah, 
Vermont, and Maine can take to protect their legitimate local concerns 
without running afoul of the Supremacy Clause. It discusses how these 
states can and cannot regulate local concerns and shows how other states 
have taken a wiser road by developing narrowly tailored requirements 
that list specific conditions for approval.  
States cannot use their authority from 274 Agreements to enact 
stringent licensing requirements aimed to block facilities under the guise 
of enacting “more stringent regulations.” Similar to the conditional-use 
permit that the Tenth Circuit struck down in Blue Circle,188 approval 
statutes giving legislatures the power to ban construction of all disposal 
facilities are preempted. Just as a state cannot place an outright ban on 
receipt of out-of-state LLRW waste,189 it cannot use an approval statute 
to accomplish the same purpose.190  
If Utah, Vermont, and Maine were attempting to regulate legitimate 
concerns through their political approval requirement statutes, they are 
not foreclosed from addressing these concerns. This analysis does not 
ignore the Supreme Court’s caution in Pacific Gas that “the promotion of 
nuclear power is not to be accomplished ‘at all costs.’”191 The Supreme 
Court was expressly recognizing that states have legitimate local 
concerns that will warrant slowing or even stopping development of 
nuclear power or disposal of waste. However, the Court was not 
sanctioning all state activity designed to thwart federal objectives in the 
absence of a clearly articulated legitimate local concern and a reasonable 
solution to address the concern. Just as the moratorium in Pacific Gas 
was a legitimate local regulation to address economic issues surrounding 
nuclear power development, states can regulate similar issues 
surrounding LLRW disposal in their borders. To protect their legitimate 
local concerns, each state needs to develop a statute that specifically lists 
 188. See Blue Circle, 27 F.3d 1499 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 189. See supra Part III (explaining that, while a compact facility has the authority to ban out-
of-compact waste, a noncompact facility has no such authority). 
 190. Blue Circle, 27 F.3d at 1508. 
 191. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 
222 (1983). 
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issues about which they are concerned and then require that a prospective 
facility comply with specific criteria. States can develop acceptable 
regulations either by (1) utilizing the concerns of the legislature and 
developing license requirements that will address these concerns or by 
(2) allowing a legislature to expressly evaluate how a prospective facility 
will affect the legislatures concerns, provided the statute gives reasonable 
criteria for evaluating whether a potential site meets the local concerns.  
However, it must be possible for a potential facility to comply with 
the valid state regulations. The reason that a local ordinance requiring 
potential RCRA disposal facilities to obtain a conditional use permit in 
Blue Circle was struck down was not because it did not list specific 
conditions, but because it was not possible for a facility to comply with 
those conditions.192 For example, if a state wanted to specify the type of 
location that would be suitable for a LLRW disposal facility, it could 
give a list of criteria that it must comply with: (1) the distance from 
residential areas, (2) the location of water and transportation, (3) the size 
of the required plot, (4) the economic feasibility of a waste disposal 
facility at a certain site, etc. If the state lists criteria that a potential 
facility can actually comply with, its regulation is more likely to be 
permissible. 
For example, Connecticut has passed a statute that lists a number of 
factors to consider in locating a potential disposal site.193 Some of the 
factors require the state to evaluate the risk that a facility poses to local 
public health, safety, and welfare; the effect of the facility on planned 
local land use and development; the effects of the facility on agricultural 
and natural resources and the availability of resources for mitigating or 
eliminating such adverse effects; the effect of a facility on private and 
public water supplies; and the current and projected population density in 
the area.194
Applying these criteria to a potential site evaluates whether the site 
will comply with these specifically listed local concerns. It would be a 
reasonable response to a legitimate local concern for a state to deny a 
potential facility from being constructed in an area that would threaten 
the state’s water supply or in an area that was projected to be densely 
populated in the near future. These were the types of concerns that 
Pacific Gas recognized when it noted that nuclear power was not to be 
 192. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 193. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-163c (2002). 
 194. Id. 
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developed at all costs. Just as some legitimate local concerns justified 
suspending or stopping construction of nuclear power plants,195 some 
legitimate local concerns justify suspending or stopping waste disposal in 
a state. 
However, each state needs to remember the Blue Circle admonition 
that the state bears the burden to develop a record to establish that any 
regulation of LLRW is a reasonable response to a legitimate local 
concern. Applying the modified Blue Circle test will determine which 
types of state regulation are a permissible exercise of state power and 
which types of regulation are a state legislature’s attempt to nullify 
unwanted federal legislation by simply publishing a legislative 
committee report articulating some state interest or policy—other than 
frustration of the federal objective—that would be tangentially furthered 
by a proposed state law.196
V. CONCLUSION 
Because both outright bans and standardless approval statutes that 
shift the political control over LLRW disposal facilities to the states 
function as a de facto ban, both types of statutes are preempted. Any 
other application of conflict preemption principles would undermine the 
effect of preemption mandated by the Supremacy Clause and cripple the 
application of the nation’s LLRW policy. If the states are permitted to 
use regulatory-type statutes to keep waste disposal facilities from 
operating within their bounds, a race-to-the-bottom situation will 
develop, and the state of LLRW disposal will reach a crisis worse than 
the 1980 crisis that led Congress to adopt the LLRW Policy Act. 
The Tenth Circuit in Skull Valley noted that waste disposal is a 
“matter which presents complex technological, economic, and political 
challenges to those seeking effective solutions.”197 States with legitimate 
local concerns about waste disposal need to adapt their statutes to 
identify the local concerns and formulate a reasonable response to 
address the concern. Such an adaptation would avoid the appearance that 
a standardless approval requirement is a de facto ban on construction of 
LLRW disposal facilities. To the extent that Utah, Maine, and Vermont 
 195. See supra Part III.A (discussing the holding in Pacific Gas that determined that a 
legitimate state interest justified stopping or slowing federal goals to develop nuclear power).  
 196. See Blue Circle, 27 F.3d 1499, 1509 (10th Cir. 1994). 
 197. Skull Valley, 376 F.3d 1223, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004) (discussing the disposal of high-level 
spent nuclear fuel not LLRW). 
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have legitimate local concerns surrounding disposal of LLRW that are 
not addressed in their licensing process, each state should address those 
concerns in a more narrow statute that reasonably responds to its state 
interests. Otherwise, the states will leave their citizens unprotected 
against potential dangers associated with waste disposal after their bans 
or approval statutes are struck down in court.  
Melissa Beutler Orien 
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